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    Abstract* 
 
In this paper, we study the relation between decision makers’ 
preferences and training investments of their firms. First, we 
develop a theoretical framework, which takes the possibility into 
account that individual preferences of decision makers may 
influence firm behavior with respect to training. We then develop 
and test the hypothesis that the willingness to take risks or the 
preference for future profits of decision makers is positively related 
and procrastination negatively related to firms’ investment in 
worker training. Using unique firm-level data, including both 
person-level preference measures and firm-level information about 
training costs, we find empirical support for our hypothesis. 
Training investment is higher in firms with risk-inclined decision 
makers and lower in firms with procrastinating decision makers. 
The preference for future profits is relevant for training 
participation and the number of trained workers, but not for the 
training investment per worker. The results imply that firms have 
scope to adjust their profit-maximizing strategies by taking the 
individual preferences of their decision makers into account. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The importance of personal preferences for economic and educational choices has been 
highlighted in a quickly growing strand of literature. Among others, risk attitudes and time 
preferences have been identified as important determinants for individual economic choices 
(Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004; Dohmen et al., 2009, 2011). At the same time, some studies 
focus on the relation between manager characteristics and the firm-level decision making (e.g. 
Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Wang et al. 2016). However, merging the two strands of literature, 
few works provide empirical evidence for the link between decision makers’ preferences and 
firm-level investment.  
This paper aims to contribute to the literature by analyzing this link using large-scale survey 
data. It addresses the question of how risk attitudes and time preferences of decision makers 
relate to firm investment in the human capital of their workers. It argues that human capital 
investment in the form of worker training is an ideal case for studying this relationship because 
this type of investment is prone to risk due to the potential mobility of workers (Becker, 1962).  
The data for the empirical analysis stems from a unique firm-level survey providing both 
detailed information on firm investment in worker training and measures for the risk attitudes 
and time preferences of respondents who have decision-making power in the firm (i.e. 
owners/partners, managers, heads of a HRM department). Risk attitudes are surveyed in the 
form of a direct assessment, i.e. the respondents report their willingness to take risks. This 
procedure of measuring risk attitudes has been identified as the most valid in experimental 
settings (Dohmen et al., 2011). The assessment of individuals’ time preference relies on two 
different concepts. The first is a concept of procrastination, i.e. the respondents report their 
tendency to delay action although it would be better to solve the issue immediately. The second 
is the concept of discounting, i.e. individuals report their willingness to give up something that 
is beneficial for them today (e.g. consumption) in order to obtain a profit in the future.  
First, we draw on a simple profit-maximization model for firms and introduce decision 
makers’ economic preferences as factors into the model. Based on this framework, we expect 
that higher personal preferences for risk and future profits are positively related to a firm’s 
training investment. Conversely, we expect a higher level of procrastination to reduce the 
training investment in a firm.  
In the empirical analysis, we focus on three different training outcomes: the training 
probability of a firm, the number of workers trained and the amount of resources invested per 
trained worker. The findings suggest that the preferences of decision makers in a firm are 
important determinants for firm-level training outcomes. The higher the decision maker’s 
preference for future profits, the higher the likelihood that the firm provides training and the 
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more workers are trained. Furthermore, a decision maker’s willingness to take risks relates 
positively to the firm’s training investments. With respect to time preferences, the results 
suggest a negative relation between a decision maker’s procrastination and the firm’s training 
investments. 
The analysis in this paper contributes to the literature by showing that firm-level decisions 
may be contingent on manager-level preferences, a link that has rarely been studied based on 
large-scale empirical data. The results have strong implications for theoretical models 
explaining strategic firm behavior in competitive markets. 
This paper provides a brief discussion of the relevant literature in the following section.  
Section 3 then focuses on theoretical background and develops a framework that includes 
individual preferences in a firm-level profit maximization setting. Section 4 describes the data 
source and variable construction for the empirical analysis. Section 5 discusses the results and 
provides robustness tests. Section 6 concludes the paper with some policy and practice 
implications.  
  
2. Literature  
This section first discusses literature about economic preferences and their role in 
determining individual and firm decisions. It then focuses on studies analyzing worker training 
and its risks from a firm’s perspective. 
 
2.1 Economic preferences and their influence on economic behavior 
The literature discusses different types of individual preferences and their significance for 
economic decision making. When addressing economic investment decisions, time preferences 
and risk attitudes in particular have been at the center of attention (see e.g. Falk et al., 2015). 
Risk attitudes describe the personal preferences of individuals to take risks (Kahneman and 
Riepe, 1998; Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis, 2002), while time preferences refer to the trade-
off decision between future and current benefits (Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004). Even though 
value discounting of risky assets relies on a different cognitive process than the value 
discounting of future assets (Green and Myerson, 2004), many empirical studies consider both 
concepts due to their strong correlation: Investing in a future asset is always associated with a 
certain positive risk that the desired outcome cannot be realized (Borghans et al., 2008; 
Andersen et al., 2008a). Both, time and risk preferences have a strong influence on individual 
behavior.  
In general terms, the literature shows that risk attitudes are relevant for individual 
investment behavior. Risk prone individuals invest significantly more in risky assets concerning 
portfolio choices (Dohmen et al., 2011; Guiso and Paiella, 2008; Kapteyn and Teppa, 2011). 
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Moreover, they seem to be more optimistic concerning the investment of primary capital and are 
more likely to become self-employed (Armstrong and Huck, 2010; Caliendo et al., 2014; 
Skriabikova et al., 2014). The literature further shows that risk-averse individuals choose 
occupations with lower wage risks, for example occupations in the public sector, meaning that 
such people prefer certainty regarding returns for their working efforts (Bonin et al., 2007; 
Guiso and Paiella, 2008). Risk preferences are also relevant when it comes to investments in the 
individual’s human capital. Brown et al. (2006) provide evidence that risk-averse individuals 
show a lower educational attainment than risk-inclined individuals because the former are less 
willing to invest in their education.  
Individual time preferences also relate to actual behavior in the real world. Golsteyn et al. 
(2014) find that high individual discount rates are related to lower incomes at middle age, which 
appears to be mediated by early human capital investments. Furthermore, patient individuals 
seem to actively choose occupations with steeper wage dynamics, indicating that they accept the 
latency until higher returns emerge. People even change occupations when realizing their 
preferences are not in line with the occupational criteria (Fouarge et al., 2014). When examining 
the explaining factors for varying participation in workers’ training, Fouarge et al. (2013) find 
that low educated workers participate less in training than highly-educated workers. The authors 
provide evidence that this difference is partly due to a lower future orientation of less educated 
workers, leading to a decrease in their willingness to participate in training. 
Experimental studies have investigated time preferences and their dependence on the timing 
and amount of the reward in more detail. Unlike traditional economic theories would assume, 
the studies find that time preferences are not constant. The most prevalent anomaly from 
rational decision making is the concept of hyperbolic discounting, which describes the decline 
of discount rates over time (see Frederick et al., 2002 for a review). Hyperbolic discounting 
implies that individuals become more patient when choosing between two delayed options as 
compared to choosing between an immediate and a delayed option. In this context, Benhabib et 
al. (2009) find that individuals are strongly influenced by a present bias and that discount rates 
decline with delay and amount. The strong tendency toward the present could partly be 
explained by procrastination and self-control problems. Accordingly, Reuben et al. (2015) find 
that the preference for an individual’s immediacy is strongly linked to their tendency to 
procrastinate.  
Via the decisions individuals take, risk attitudes and time preferences can also have an 
influence on the economic output. Tanaka et al. (2010) provide evidence for a correlation 
between Vietnamese villages’ wealth and the risk attitudes of their inhabitants. Wealthy villages 
are associated with a lower loss aversion and lower discount rates. The mechanism driving this 
relation is that risk aversion and impatience leads people to avoid establishing businesses and 
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reduces the likelihood that they will invest in their children, which in turn diminishes the latter’s 
chance for high returns in the future. However, there is also evidence that a strong tendency for 
riskiness is not always associated with the highest return. Caliendo et al. (2014) find that 
entrepreneurs with a medium risk tolerance are the most successful.  
 
2.2 Individual risk preferences and firm behavior  
Can the findings of risk- and time-preference effects be transferred to firms’ investment 
decisions? As firms’ decisions are also made by human beings, the former could also be 
influenced by individual biases and personal preferences. Evidence from the field of 
organization theory and behavior shows that strategies of firms are often related to the values of 
their managers, who take decisions on behalf of the firm. The upper echelons theory, for 
example, states that general characteristics of managers affect firm strategies and firm 
performance (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Bertrand and Schoar (2003) provide evidence for 
significant influences of managers’ personalities on firms’ policy decisions, such as investment 
behavior, and even indicate the existence of robust managing style patterns. Armstrong and 
Huck (2010) argue that influences, such as human preferences, may be the reason why firms do 
not always strive for profit maximization. The authors discuss positive and negative reciprocity 
as central factors when deciding how to participate in market processes, such as decisions 
concerning merging, collusion, competing and product pricing.  
Recent evidence in the field of personnel psychology (Wang et al. 2016) finds that CEOs’ 
characteristics such as age, tenure, career experience, and aspects of the managers’ personalities, 
such as CEOs’ positive self-concept, are significantly related to a firm’s strategic actions, 
among them decisions on acquisitions, capital investments, product innovation and, more in 
general, risk taking.  
Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that managers’ risk attitudes affect firm behavior. 
Examining the relation between early-life experience of CEOs’ and their cooperate decisions, 
Bernile et al. (2017) find that the mechanism is channeled by CEOs’ risk attitudes affecting 
corporate risk taking. Rashad Abdel-Khalik (2014) investigates the relationship between risk 
preferences of managers and their investment behavior. The author argues that top managers are 
pivotal for the strategies taken by the firm, among those the strategies concerning investments. 
The study shows, for example, that firms with managers who are risk inclined invest 
significantly more in research and development. For developing countries, Kremer et al. (2013) 
or Pattillo and Soderbom (2000) find a relation between risk attitudes of firm managers and firm 
behavior. The studies suggest that firms with risk-inclined owners invest more and grow faster 
as compared to firms with risk-averse managers. Tanaka and Sawada (2015) elicit risk 
preferences through experiments with managers from textile and garment firms in Lao PDR. 
6 
They investigate the relation between risk preferences and financing strategies and investment 
in their factories’ safety measures against fires and injuries. The results show that risk-averse 
managers are less likely to borrow loans from the bank, which leads to lower asset levels. 
However, they tend to invest more in safety measure than risk-inclined managers. Cucculelli 
and Ermini (2013) find for a sample of Italian entrepreneurs that risk-inclined managers select 
products that have in turn a positive effect on firm growth. Furthermore, Graham et al. (2013) 
find that risk-tolerant CEOs are more likely to make mergers and acquisitions.  
Summing up, several studies suggest a non-trivial link between risk attitudes of managers 
and cooperate behavior, including investment behavior. With respect to investments in human 
capital, Jansen (2016) provides empirical evidence for managers’ altruism and time preferences 
relating positively to the financing of apprenticeships in firms. However, the relation between 
investments in human capital and risk preferences has not been discussed in the literature.  
 
2.3 Firms’ training investment as an example for “risky” investment 
One important decision that firms are facing is the question of whether and how much to 
invest in their workers’ human capital. Providing continuous training can yield substantial and 
direct productivity returns to the firm (see Leuven, 2005 for a general overview). Moreover, the 
literature provides evidence for indirect effects such as spillover effects (De Grip and 
Sauermann, 2012). However, as worker training is costly for the firm, there is a time and risk 
dimension. First, training returns are by definition generated in the future. Second, there is a 
certain positive risk that the returns to training cannot be realized at all.  
In the following, we briefly discuss why the realization of training returns is prone to 
substantial risks. The most important risk is that workers do not stay in the firm after having 
received their training. Workers might quit because of various external reasons or they leave 
due to (wage) incentives to take on a job in another firm. Thereby, leaving could either be the 
result of a self-initiated job search or the worker is poached by another firm.
1
 
Another risk associated with training investments is that the firm cannot be fully certain 
about the appropriateness and quality of training provided (e.g. the trainer-training-trainee 
match). Negative outcomes, such as lacking learning transfer or even adverse training effects, 
are also possible (Holladay and Quiñones, 2008). Additionally, in contrast to physical capital, 
human capital cannot be separated from its owner, meaning that there is a reduced scope for a 
flexible interchange of human capital between workers (Levhari and Weiss, 1974). Investing in 
new technical devices, for example, offers flexibility because it can be passed on from one 
                                                          
1 With respect to the poaching, Muehlemann and Wolter (2011) find that firms provide less apprenticeship training in 
densely-populated areas because firms are more afraid of poaching in dense labor markets. 
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worker to another when necessary. Knowledge and skills, however, cannot be transferred as 
easily.  
Considering this spectrum of different types of risks related to investment in human capital, 
the next section presents a model in which risk and time preferences have an influence on the 
training investments of firms. While risk-averse decision makers should perceive the risk as 
rather threatening, we assume risk prone managers to perceive them as an opportunity. 
Moreover, we assume that decision makers with a long-term focus are more likely to invest in 
workers’ training than decision makers with a short-term focus. 
 
3 Theoretical framework 
Our starting point is a simple theoretical model on the optimal amount of training that firms 
provide to their workers. Each firm can decide whether it provides their workers with 
continuous training and if they do, they can decide how much training to provide. Providing 
more training will lead to higher returns to the firm, but will also be associated with higher 
costs. Depending on the specific form of the cost and benefit function, an optimal amount of 
training investment can be derived. The firms can decide upon both the quality and quantity of 
training, which will each be subsumed under the amount of training.  
We first show that the optimal investment in workers’ training is a decision that involves a 
clear time and risk dimension. In a second step, we discuss how the time preferences and risk 
attitudes of decision makers can be integrated in this model. 
 
3.1 Optimal amount of training 
As discussed above, many studies have explained why firms can generate returns from 
training. For this model, we do not differentiate between the channels through which the 
training returns are generated. It suffices to know that, on average, assuming imperfect 
competition and some degree of specific human capital, there will be some post-training returns. 
In the model, we assume that training is technologically general but that frictions lead to a 
market wage lower than the worker’s productivity. Let us assume that training returns (𝑏) 
depend on the amount of training and 𝑏(𝑡)′ > 0 ;  𝑏 (𝑡)′′ <  0.  
Nonetheless, there is a certain positive probability for the firm that post-training returns 
cannot be realized. Therefore, the probability that the returns can be realized is given by 𝑝. This 
may occur because the worker separates with an exogenous probability from the training firm or 
because, albeit her course attendance, the worker did not learn the relevant knowledge and 
skills. Moreover, future returns must be discounted with the discount rate  𝑟 to obtain their 
present value (Borjas, 2008).  
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The costs for training are given by 𝑐(𝑡) and we assume that they are linear and increasing in 
the amount of training. This also implies that average training costs will be equal to marginal 
training costs. Firms want to maximize their profits and the profit function of firms can be 
written as:  
 
𝜋 = 𝑝 ∙
1
(1 + 𝑟)
∙   𝑏(𝑡)  − 𝑐(𝑡) (1) 
 
The optimal amount of training is given, if the first order condition is fulfilled:  
 
𝑝 ∙
1
(1 + 𝑟)
∙   𝑏′(𝑡)  = 𝑐′(𝑡) (2) 
 
Plugging in 𝑓 ∙ tα for the training returns, with α between 0 and 1 and f sufficiently high that 
the optimal training level is positive (i.e. at least 1
2
), and assuming that c′(t) = 1, we obtain the 
optimal amount of training as given by:
3
 
 
𝑡∗  = (
𝑓 ∙  𝛼 𝑝𝑏  
1 + 𝑟
)
1
(1−𝛼)⁄
 (3) 
 
The equation shows that the optimal amount of training depends on the discount rate 𝑟, the 
probability to obtain the training returns 𝑝𝑏 and the degree of decreasing marginal utility of 
training α. The higher a firm’s discount rate the less training it would provide. Moreover, the 
more likely it can obtain the training returns, the more training it is willing to provide. 
Therefore, the decision on the optimal amount of training involves a time and risk dimension. 
 
3.2 The influence of decision makers’ preferences on worker training 
The fundamental assumption that we make in this paper and that is backed up by the 
literature in Section 2.2 is that it is not the firm as an abstract entity that makes the investment 
decision but rather an individual who acts on behalf of the firm. We show that this assumption 
has certain implications for the optimal training decision in the firm. Although managers 
operating in a professional world will try to represent the firm’s interest as well as they can, 
their individual preferences will influence the (training) decisions they take to some degree.  
More precisely, as we have shown that the training decision involves a clear time and risk 
dimension, we expect that the individual preferences regarding the time and risk have an 
influence on the optimal amount of training provided by the firm.  
                                                          
2
 The minimum level of f  is obtained by equating the optimal level of t* with at least one and solving the equation for 
f:  𝑓 >
1+𝑟
𝛼 𝑝
 . 
3
 See Equations A1 in the appendix for the intermediate steps. 
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The standard training models assume that firms and workers are risk-neutral and that there 
is no discounting (Leuven, 2005). Even though discounting is generally considered in the 
human capital literature when it comes to workers’ individual training or educational decision 
(Borjas, 2008), the effect of individual discount rates on the behavior of firms is usually not 
explicitly taken into account. Nonetheless, when acknowledging in the model that the firms’ 
profits are maximized by individuals, i.e. the decision makers within the firm, the literature on 
organizational behavior imply individual preferences to play a role.  
To introduce this relationship in the model, the constant discount rate is replaced by a 
discount rate specific to the decision maker (𝑟𝐷𝑚). To include risk attitudes in the model, we 
add an additional indicator (risk) as a factor for the probability that the training returns are 
realized. If this indicator is greater than one, an individual is “risk inclined”. If the indicator is 
lower than 1, an individual is “risk averse”. Risk aversion means that the certainty equivalent is 
greater than the expected return. The profit function from the decision makers’ perspective is 
thus given by: 
 
𝜋𝐷𝑚 =  𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐷𝑚  ∙  𝑝 ∙
1
(1 + 𝑟𝐷𝑚)
∙   𝑏(𝑡)  − 𝑐(𝑡) 
(4) 
 
 
Again, plugging in tα for the training returns yields the optimal training investments, but 
this time they depend additionally on the individual time and risk preferences.  
 
𝑡𝐷𝑚
∗  = (
 f ∙  𝛼 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐷𝑚 𝑝  
1 + 𝑟𝐷𝑚
)
1
(1−𝛼)⁄
 (5) 
 
The decision to provide worker training thus depends on the risk attitudes in the sense that 
risk-inclined managers will provide more training. Moreover, the training decision depends on 
the time preferences, in the sense that managers with a higher preference for future profits 
provide more training.
4
  
For 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐷𝑚 = 1 and 𝑟𝐷𝑚 = 𝑟, the manager’s training decision will be equal to the firm’s 
optimal training decision. However, Equation 5 also shows that the more decision makers depart 
from risk neutrality and rational discount rates, the larger will be the distance from the optimal 
training decision from a firm’s perspective.  
                                                          
4
 We acknowledge the possibility that, apart from training, other investment options exist for the decision 
maker in the firm. These could ‘compete’ with the investment in training. However, as some of the 
studies discussed in the literature section already address other investment options, this paper focuses 
solely on the investment in training.  
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To illustrate this relationship, we plotted the marginal costs and returns from the firm’s and 
the decision maker’s perspective in Figure 1. The marginal costs are constant and the expected 
marginal returns are given by:  
 
𝛼 ∙  𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐷𝑚  ∙  𝑝𝑏 ∙
1
(1+𝑟𝐷𝑚)
∙  𝑓 ∙ 𝑡𝛼−1    (6) 
 
The following figure shows how the chosen training decision changes according to the 
decision maker’s risk preference (assuming time neutrality).  
Assuming that the value for risk is below 1, Figure 1 shows that the decision maker would 
choose  tDm1*, i.e. a lower amount of training than tfirm*, which would be optimal from the firm’s 
perspective. Vice versa, if the decision maker was risk inclined with a value larger than 1, the 
firm’s realized amount of training would be tDm2*, an amount larger than the optimum tfirm*. The 
respective figure could also be drawn for different types of time preferences (assuming risk 
neutrality).  
 
Figure 1: Optimal amount of training from both the decision maker’s (Dm) and the firm’s 
perspective, assuming risk neutrality, risk inclination and risk aversion of the decision maker 
 
 
 
In the real world, the optimal training level is often unknown due to imperfect information 
about the future training benefits. Thus, even in case of risk neutrality and objective discount 
rates it may be the case that decision makers do not choose the optimal amount of training 
because they are not aware of the future benefits. Only when the optimal training investment is 
known under risk and time neutrality, preferences in one or the other direction would lead to a 
deviation from the optimal training decision. In this paper, we cannot test whether or to what 
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extend risk and time preferences are related to a deviation of the optimal training decision. 
However, irrespective of information about the training optimum, we derive the following 
hypothesis on the relation between preferences and the amount of training: 
 
1.) Firms with decision makers reporting a higher willingness to take risks invest more in 
their workers’ training.  
2.) Firms with decision makers reporting higher levels of procrastination invest less in their 
workers’ training.  
3.) Firms with decision makers reporting higher preferences toward the future invest more 
in their workers’ training.  
 
4 Data and variables 
In this section, we describe the data base and the main dependent and independent variables 
for our empirical analysis. 
 
4.1 Data: Firm-level survey 
The data used for the empirical analysis in this paper stems from the BIBB Cost-Benefit 
Survey (BIBB CBS) of 2012/2013, which provides detailed information on both firms’ 
investment in the training of skilled workers and the risk attitudes and time preferences of the 
survey respondents, who have decision-making power in the firm (e.g. owners/partners, 
managers and heads of a HRM department etc.). The questions for the measurement of training 
investment and the module on decision makers’ preferences were implemented in the survey for 
the purpose of this analysis. 
The survey was conducted in fall 2013 by means of personal interviews (CAPI). The 
fieldwork was organized by the infas Insitute for Applied Sciences, Bonn. The sample of firms 
stems from the firm register at the Federal Employment Agency. This register contains the 
addresses of all German establishments with at least one worker or apprentice who is subject to 
social security payments. The addresses were drawn as stratified by regions and according to 
whether or not they were engaging in apprentice training. For the analysis in this paper, we use 
firm-level probability weights to correct for disproportionate sampling due to stratification.
5
 
The initial data set contains 3,636 firms. We exclude those records for firms that have 
missing values in one of the dependent or independent variables. A large part of the excluded 
firms (544) is removed, because the respondents did not have any decision-making power in the 
firm concerning the training activities and thus (through filtering) were not asked about their 
                                                          
5 Details about the weighting procedure, non-response and survey methodology are provided in an unpublished report 
(Schiel et al., 2014), which is available upon request. 
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preferences. Of the remaining 2,589 firms, 1,768 have trained at least one worker in the year 
2012.  
 
4.2 Variables: Worker training 
The training indicators refer to a specific group of workers in the firm. More precisely, we 
ask for the provision of training for workers that have undergone a vocational training in a 
specific occupation and have not been recently hired. As such, we focus on continuing training 
(i.e. courses or seminars) of qualified workers with a specific occupational background.
6
 The 
advantage of this approach is that respondents have a clear definition of the reference group, 
which is very likely to improve the accuracy of the answers compared to the answers given for 
all the workers in the firm, regardless of qualification background and function. The respective 
occupation of the workers is included in the regression models as described below.   
In the results section, we provide estimates for three different regressions, each with a 
different dependent variable. The first regression has the mere training participation (modeled as 
a dummy of 1/0) as an outcome. All firms that provided firm-financed training to workers in the 
year 2012 are coded ‘1’, while firms without provided training are coded ‘0’.  
The second regression uses the number of workers that were trained over the course of 2012 
as the dependent variable. Those firms not providing training thus train zero workers. All 
training firms reported the number of trained workers ranging from 1 to 1,300. We interpret this 
variable as a count measure and thus apply a count-data regression model for estimates on the 
relation between preferences and the number of trained workers.    
Finally, we construct a training investment indicator to analyze the role of decision makers’ 
preferences in shaping firm-level training investments. The investment indicator is, in the 
absence of worker-level data, calculated as a firm-level average per trained worker. The 
argument for using the average investment per trained worker (rather than the average per 
worker on the basis of all employees) is that this measure is best suited for assessing the 
influence of risk and time preferences on training decisions. The more resources are invested in 
a trained worker, the higher the sunk costs are if this worker leaves the firm. 
For calculating the average training investment per trained worker, we use the direct 
monetary and time values reported in the survey. The concept of measuring and calculating 
training investment has been applied in other firm-level surveys, such as the European 
Continuing Vocational Training Survey (CVTS), and is therefore a standardized method for 
determining firms’ training investments. 
The training investment consists of  
                                                          
6
 The questions in the survey refer to workers in the occupational group of the last hired worker. 
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a) the time the trained workers are absent from work in hours (h) multiplied by their hourly 
wage (w).
7
 This measure is referred to as training absence costs (AC = h*w) and is calculated 
as the average absence costs per trained worker.  
b) the costs for providing an in-house training location, material and internal trainers. This 
measure is referred to as internal training costs (IC) per trained worker.  
c) the costs for traveling, accommodation and course fees, when training takes place outside the 
firm. This measure is referred to as external training costs (EC) per trained worker. 
 
The average training investment (TC) per trained worker in firm i is thus given by  
 
𝑇𝐶𝑖  = 𝐴𝐶𝑖 + 𝐼𝐶𝑖  + 𝐸𝐶𝑖      (6) 
 
4.3 Variables: Risk and time preferences 
In this paper, we simultaneously analyze the influence of risk attitudes and time 
preferences. The reason is that there could be a strong relation between both constructs. Even 
though they are not the same from the conceptual perspective, empirically they nearly always 
come as twins. All rewards in the future are associated with some risk that they will not be 
obtained and all risky rewards are in the future (Borghans et al., 2008).  
The risk attitude is surveyed in the form of a direct assessment, i.e. the respondents report 
their willingness to take risks on a scale from 0 to 10. The exact wording of the question is as 
follows:  
Question 1: “How do you view yourself: Are you a risk taker in general or do you tend to 
avoid risks? Please indicate your answers on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you are 
‘completely unwilling to take risks’ and 10 means you are ‘very willing to take risks’.”  
The respective survey question correlates with actual behavior, such as smoking, 
occupational choices, participation in sports, and many others (Dohmen et al., 2011), and has 
been identified as the most valid form of measuring risk attitudes in experimental settings (Falk 
et al., 2013).  
Our measurement of time preference relies on two different concepts. The first concept 
involves the intertemporal trade-off in a rather neutral way. The survey question addresses 
discounting and measures the individual’s preference for giving up consumption today for 
profits in the future. The second concept captures the hyperbolic discounting, i.e. the fact that 
individuals tend to weigh the present disproportionately high. In order to capture the concept of 
hyperbolic discounting we include a question on procrastination, as discussed in the literature. 
In answering the survey question, respondents report their tendency to delay action although it 
                                                          
7 We use the average skilled worker wage in the firm as a proxy for the wage of a worker in a specific occupation.  
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would be better to solve the issue immediately. The exact wording of the two questions is as 
follows:  
Question 2: “With regards to financial decisions, how willing are you to give up something 
that is beneficial for you today in order to benefit more from that in the future? Please use a 
scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means ‘not willing at all to give up’ and 10 means ‘very willing to 
give up’.” 
Question 3: “To which degree does the following statement apply to you? I tend to 
postpone things even though it would be better to get them done right away. Please use a scale 
from 0 to 10, where 0 means ‘does not apply at all’ and 10 means ‘applies completely’.”  
Falk et al. (2013) show that the questions correlate with the corresponding intertemporal 
behavior in experiments. More concretely, the questions correlate in a regression model with the 
discount rate measured in experiments (i.e. the average switching point with the amount of 
money today and an amount of money in 12 months). Another study uses an index of the first 
time-preference question combined with a quantitative time-preference measure and finds that 
this index also correlates strongly with patient behavior, like saving behavior and educational 
attainment (Falk et al., 2015). In general, all questions appear to reflect the variation in 
preferences well, as the whole range of answer possibilities is used. 
Even though a survey is often an artificial situation without real incentives, we decided on 
this type of measurement for various reasons. First, conducting experiments on such a large 
scale is often not possible. Second, elicitation in a survey allows us to relate the preferences to 
many other characteristics, as in our case the training investments of the firm. To the best of our 
knowledge, the BIBB CBS 2012/2013 is the only large-scale survey so far that contains 
information on both decision makers’ economic preferences and firms’ training costs. In the 
survey, we employed questions that show an internal and external validity, i.e. questions that 
have been shown to relate to both experiment and real-life behavior. 
 
4.4 Variables: Controls 
Apart from our main independent variables, i.e. the preferences of decision makers in the 
firms, we include a large set of control variables in the regression models. On the individual 
level, we include the function of the respondent in the firm. This variable has 9 categories, 
spanning from owner or CEO to different management functions of the decision maker in the 
firm. We further control for whether the decision maker is autonomous in making the decision 
or whether other persons in the firm are involved in the decision-making process.
8
  
                                                          
8 Although the question about the autonomy of decision making refers to the training of apprentices and not explicitly 
to the training of already qualified workers, we assume a strong correlation between the two decision making 
subjects, especially when simultaneously controlling for the function of the decision maker in the regressions. The 
wording of the question is: „To what extend can you decide personally, if and how many trainees are trained in the 
15 
On the firm level, we control for the firm’s age, presence of institutions (works council and 
collective bargaining coverage) and the managers’ wages. The aim of including such variables 
in the regression is that they could be correlated with both the decision makers’ preferences and 
the firms’ training investment. By including institutions (as signals for better working 
conditions) and wages of managers in the regressions, potential issues of selection of decision 
makers into certain firms are addressed.
9
 Furthermore, we control for the firm’s qualification 
structure and whether the firm trains apprentices. In the regression models, we also include the 
level of capacity utilization as an indicator for the economic situation of the firm, which could 
be correlated with both the decision maker’s risk attitude and the potential or need to invest in 
worker training. 
Finally, we add a set of structural dummy variables including firm size (4), sector (12), 
state (16) and the occupation of workers (34) to the regression models. These controls aim to 
reduce firm heterogeneity in the models that might drive training provision and the hiring of 
decision makers with specific preferences (e.g. in sectors with dynamic growth). For the main 
model regressing training investment on decision makers’ preferences, the (log) number of 
training participants is added to assess whether (dis)economies of scale exist in training several 
workers in a given period. 
 
5 Estimation strategy, results and robustness tests 
This section describes the estimation strategy and the results of our empirical analysis. It 
further provides robustness test and discusses the limitations of the data.  
 
5.1  Estimation strategy 
The main question analyzed in this paper is, whether firm-level investment in human 
capital (training of skilled workers) is contingent on the individual preferences of the decision 
maker. However, in the following analysis, we extend the scope and also focus on questions 
related to the mere likelihood (TP) and number of trained workers (TN) in the firm.  
Therefore, in a first step, we analyze whether risk attitudes (risk) and time preferences (i.e. 
procrastination (proc) and the preference for future profits (disc)) of decision makers relate to 
the training participation of the firm. For this purpose, we use a probit regression with Training 
= yes/no as the dependent variable and our preference measures on the individual level as the 
main independent variables.  
Thus, the first equation to be estimated is  
                                                                                                                                                                          
firm? Answers are: 1) “I decide on my own”, 2) “I decide together with others”, and 3) “I am not involved in the 
decision”. 
9 A further reason for including wages of decision makers in the regressions is the potential link between managerial 
compensation and risk-taking, which has been discussed in the literature (e.g. Coles et al., 2006). 
16 
 
𝑇𝑃𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐷𝑚 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝐷𝑚  + 𝛽3𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐷𝑚  + 𝛽4𝑋𝐷𝑚 + 𝛽5𝑋𝑖 + ε𝑖 ,  (7) 
 
where 𝑋𝐷𝑚 is a set of individual-level variables and 𝑋𝑖 a set of firm-level variables, as described 
above. 
In a second step, we regress the number of trained workers TN in the firm on our 
preference measures, using a count data framework (negative binomial regressions) with TN as 
the dependent variable. The choice for a negative binomial regression instead of a Poisson 
regression model is based on the observation of overdispersion in the count measure. In this 
framework, the (potential) number of trained workers is strongly related to the size of the firm. 
Therefore, we use firm size (total number of workers in the firm) as the exposure variable.
10
 We 
estimate  
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑁𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐷𝑚 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝐷𝑚  + 𝛽3𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐷𝑚  + 𝛽4𝑋𝐷𝑚 + 𝛽5𝑋𝑖 +  ε𝑖.  (8) 
 
Transforming the equation yields 
 
𝑇𝑁𝑖 = exp(𝛼)  ∙  exp (𝛽1𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐷𝑚 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝐷𝑚  + 𝛽3𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐷𝑚  + 𝛽4𝑋𝐷𝑚 + 𝛽5𝑋𝑖 + ε𝑖).           (9) 
 
In the third and last step, we use the (logarithm of) training investment per trained worker 
log(TC) as an outcome variable in an OLS regression to determine the role of decision makers 
preferences for firms’ investment behavior: 
 
log (𝑇𝐶)𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐷𝑚 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝐷𝑚  + 𝛽3𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐷𝑚  + 𝛽4𝑋𝐷𝑚 + 𝛽5𝑋𝑖 +  ε𝑖.  (10) 
 
5.2 Results: Description of the main variables 
This section of the paper first provides descriptive information on both the main 
independent and the main dependent variables. It then provides regression results and discusses 
their robustness and limitations. 
Starting with the decision makers’ preferences, Figure 2 provides the distributions of risk 
attitudes and time preferences. While the willingness to take risks is close to normally 
distributed with a median of 5, the distribution of procrastination is skewed to the left with a 
median of 2. Finally, the distribution of preferring future profits is skewed to the right with a 
median of 7. The three preference measures are only marginally correlated, with correlation 
coefficients between 0.028 and 0.089. 
                                                          
10 See Cameron and Trivedi (2013) for a discussion on count data analysis and the implementation of exposure 
variables in the regression models. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of the individual preferences of decision makers 
     
              Willingness to take risks           Procrastination    Preference for future profits 
     (0=low, 10=high)                                        (0=low, 10=high)                        (0=low, 10=high) 
Source: BIBB CBS 2012/2013 
 
Table A1 in the appendix provides descriptive information about the main dependent 
variables of training provision, the number of trained workers and the training investment per 
trained worker. 64 percent of the firms provide training to at least one worker, with an average 
training duration of 36 hours per trained worker. The average number of workers trained is 2.54 
across all firms (i.e. including the zeros of non-training firms), and firms spend close to € 1,200 
per worker trained. The majority of the training investments are external training costs (EC) 
with a mean of € 576 and absence costs (AC) with a mean of € 482. Internal training costs (IC), 
on the contrary, make up for only 12 percent of the total investment (€ 137). Figure A1 provides 
a graphical display of the distribution of training investment per trained worker. Descriptive 
information about the individual-level and firm-level independent variables used in the 
regression models are given in Table A2.  
In the following section, we first discuss the results referring to the relationship between 
decision makers’ preferences and training participation and the number of workers trained in the 
firm. We then turn to the results from regressing the training investment per trained worker on 
decision makers’ preferences. In the respective tables, we provide results for three different 
models, with Model (i) being the baseline model, Model (ii) being the baseline model plus the 
set of individual-level variables 𝑋𝐷𝑚 and finally with Model (iii) adding firm-level controls 𝑋𝑖 
to Model (ii). 
 
5.3 Results: Regression analysis 
Table A3 in the appendix shows the results from regressing our first dependent variable 
(training participation) on the preferences of decision makers in firms. The table provides results 
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for the baseline regression (Model (i)), the baseline regression plus additional individual 
variables (Model (ii)) and the full model (Model (iii)) that also includes firm-level variables.  
The regression results imply no statistically significant relation between the risk attitude 
and firms’ training participation. Likewise, the coefficients of procrastination are insignificant 
in all three models. However, the coefficient of decision makers’ preference for future profits is 
positive and significant at the 5-percent level in the full model, indicating that firms with a 
future-oriented decision maker are more likely to provide training to their workers.  
With respect to the set of control variables, the function in the firm plays an important role 
for the training participation. If CEOs and heads of departments are deciding on training 
participation, firms are more likely to participate than if the owner of the firm takes the decision. 
In addition, the (average) wage on the manager level is positively correlated with the likelihood 
of providing training to the workers. 
Similar to the regression results in Table A3, the negative binomial regression results in 
Table A4 suggest that decision makers’ preference for future profits increases the training 
involvement of firms. The respective coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 
10-percent level, indicating that more workers are trained in firms, in which the decision maker 
prefers future profits over current consumption. Again, coefficients on risk attitude and 
procrastination show the expected sign (i.e. positive and negative, respectively), but are not 
significantly different from zero.
11
 
Table 1 provides results from the OLS regressions that include training investment per 
trained worker in the firm as the dependent variable. These results differ from the previous 
regressions in that they suggest risk attitudes and procrastination of decision makers to be 
relevant factors in determining firm-level training investments. Concerning risk attitudes, the 
coefficient remains large and significant throughout the three different models (Model (i) to 
Model (iii)). According to Model (iii) in the table, an increase of the risk preference of one unit 
increases firms’ training investments by 5.5 percent.  
With respect to procrastination, we find a negative and significant (at the 5-percent level) 
relationship, which is in line with our expectations as formulated in Hypothesis 2: Firms with 
decision makers showing higher levels of procrastination invest less in their workers’ training. 
The coefficient implies that an increase in one unit of procrastination reduces training 
investments by 3.7 percent.
12
 
In comparison to the previous regressions on training participation and the number of 
workers trained, the decision makers’ preference for future profits is statistically not related to 
                                                          
11 Note that the ln(alpha) in Model (iii) is significant, which supports the choice of a negative binomial regression 
model instead of a Poisson regression model. 
12
 The change from an insignificant to a significant coefficient of procrastination from Model (ii) to Model (iii) is 
mainly driven by the inclusion of the institutional variables (works councils and collective bargaining) and the 
inclusion of occupational controls. 
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the training investment of the firm. This result does not lend support to Hypothesis 3, which 
proposes a positive relationship between the decision makers’ preference for future profits and 
the training investment of the firm. 
 
Table 1: Training investment and decision makers’ preferences 
Dependent variable: (Ln) Training investments per trained worker 
 Model (i): baseline Model (ii): (i) + 𝑋𝐷𝑚 Model (iii): (ii) + 𝑋𝑖 
Willingness to take risks     0.061
***
    0.063
***
    0.055
***
 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.017) 
Procrastination -0.028 -0.021  -0.037
**
 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) 
Preference for future profits -0.028 -0.034 -0.028 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.022) 
Reference: Owner/partner of firm 
 
   
Interviewed person: CEO    0.304
**
   0.330
**
 
  (0.132) (0.139) 
Interviewed: Head of department  0.306 0.333
*
 
  (0.207) (0.175) 
Interviewed: Head of HRM    0.578
**
 0.166 
  (0.238) (0.214) 
Interviewed: Head of HR 
development 
     1.020
***
   0.693
**
 
  (0.240) (0.296) 
Interviewed: Business admin. 
manager 
 -0.229 -0.100 
  (0.376) (0.362) 
Interviewed: Technical manager      0.815
***
 0.558
**
 
  (0.145) (0.227) 
Interviewed: Training manager      0.611
***
 0.624
*
 
  (0.198) (0.319) 
Interviewed: Other function in firm  -0.037 -0.251 
  (0.195) (0.179) 
Only decision maker  0.110  0.171
*
 
  (0.125) (0.102) 
Firm older than 20 years   -0.147 
   (0.095) 
Wage on management level (in €)   0.000 
   (0.000) 
Works council in firms   0.120 
   (0.145) 
Covered by collective bargaining   -0.026 
   (0.098) 
Firm trains apprentices   -0.026 
   (0.076) 
Utilized capacity of firm: Fully used   -0.004 
   (0.099) 
Number of workers trained (ln)    -0.047 
   (0.067) 
Qualification structure controls No No Yes 
Firm size controls No No Yes 
Economic sector controls No No Yes 
Occupation controls No No Yes 
Regional controls No No Yes 
Constant 6.632*** 6.461*** 6.061*** 
 (0.211) (0.229) (0.428) 
R2 0.030 0.070 0.339 
Observations 1768 1768 1768 
Notes: OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. Data source is the BIBB CBS 2012. 
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Taken together, the differences in the results in our two time-preference measures suggest 
that hyperbolic discounting (as measured by procrastination) is a relevant determinant for 
training investments, while the linear discounting is relevant for the training decision and 
number of trained workers. These findings confirm that the underlying mechanisms should be 
modeled separately instead of using merely one of the time preferences available in the survey.   
Concerning the other independent variables in the regressions, we find no direct evidence 
for economies or diseconomies of scale, as the (log) of the number of trained workers is not 
significantly related to training investments. Table 1 further shows that the function of the 
decision maker in the firm relates significantly to the firm’s investment in training. Being a 
CEO or the head of department increases the training investment as compared to being the 
owner/partner of a firm. In addition, making decisions alone or together with other colleagues in 
the firm appears to play a role.  
Because both the function in the firm and the autonomy of decision making could be 
correlated with the preferences measured in the survey, we address this and other issues in the 
following section.  
 
5.4 Robustness and limitations 
In this section, we undertake several adjustments to our main regression specifications in 
order to test for the robustness of the results. We then discuss the data limitations of the study. 
 
5.4.1 Robustness 
Concerning the robustness of results, we provide a set of additional estimates. First, as 
implied by the regression results in Table 1, the function and the autonomy of decision making 
seem to have an independent influence on the training investment. To test whether our results 
hold when focusing on only those decision makers that hold key functions in the firm, we 
restrict the sample to different groups of decision makers. Column 1 in Table A5 provides 
estimates for the owners/partners of the firm. The regression in Column 2 additionally includes 
senior managers (CEOs and heads of departments) in the sample and Column 3 further restricts 
the sample to fully autonomous decision makers, i.e. decision makers taking the decision 
independently from other people in the firm. All three regressions largely confirm the relevance 
of risk attitudes and procrastination for firm-level training investments, albeit at a varying 
significance levels and with coefficient sizes between 0.37 and 0.52.  
Second, we take a closer look at the different subcomponents of training investments in 
order to test, whether the relation between decision makers’ preferences and firms’ training 
investment is driven by certain components of the indicator. We therefore regress the 
subcomponents from equation (6), i.e. absence costs (AC), internal costs (IC) and external costs 
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(EC) on the decision makers’ preferences. We further provide estimates for the training hours 
per trained worker (h) as a non-monetary outcome. We run Tobit regressions with the 
untransformed components as dependent variables to take into account the varying number of 
zero observations in those variables. The results in Table A6 in the appendix suggest that the 
willingness to take risks is positively related to all three of the investment components and the 
number of training hours per trained worker. For procrastination, the (negative) relation is 
particularly strong for absence costs and the average training hours per worker.  
Third, we acknowledge the lack of individual-level socio-demographic characteristics in 
our survey data. The literature in the field suggests that gender and age are correlated with the 
willingness to take risks (e.g. Filippin and Crosetto, 2016 or Dohmen et al., 2011). Moreover, 
procrastination appears to decrease with age but does not necessarily differ between men and 
women (Beutel et al., 2016). Time preferences (here: the value of future options) appear to be 
positively related to age and being male (Bishai, 2004).  
The problem arising from the lack of individual-level variables in the data is that these 
could be correlated with both the respective preference as measured in the survey and the 
training investment in the firm. As an example, older managers or owners of a firm could have a 
lower willingness to take risks, and at the same time view training as a lower priority relative to 
younger decision makers, because training primarily pays off in the long run, possibly past their 
retirement. With the age control lacking in the regression, we would observe a positive 
correlation between the willingness to take risks and firms’ training investment. Yet, this 
relation would exist due to omitting the age control rather than due to a true causal relationship.  
However, we expect the subgroup of decision makers (i.e. mostly owners/partners and 
managers) to be more homogeneous in their socio-demographic characteristics than the total 
population of labor market participants. Caliendo et al. (2009) show that risk attitudes differ by 
gender in the total population and, at the same time, are significant predictors for 
entrepreneurship. The authors follow that these combined results explain the lower share of 
female entrepreneurs. In other words, male and female entrepreneurs are likely to be more 
similar with respect to their risk attitudes than the male and female working population as a 
whole.  
To offer an additional treatment for this problem, we identify economic sectors in which 
the gender of managers is relatively homogeneous. The data used for the identification of these 
sectors is the German Mikrozensus of the year 2012. Using this data, we use the group of 
managers (ISCO-group 1) to aggregate the socio-demographic characteristics on the sector 
level. Selecting sectors with a quota of male managers above 70%, we run the same regression 
as displayed in Table 1. With respect to training participation and number of trained workers, 
the results presented in Table A7 are in line with those for the full sample (Tables A3 and A4). 
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Further, the relation between decision makers’ risk attitudes and firms’ training investment 
remains robust, whereas the coefficient on procrastination turns insignificant when using the 
restricted sample. Despite the latter deviation from the full-sample results, the focus on sectors 
with mainly male decision makers does not suggest that omitting socio-demographic variables 
in the regressions alters the observed relation between individual preferences and firms’ training 
behavior.
13
  
Fourth, we recognize the vast amount of studies discussing the general or specific contents 
of worker training and propose a robustness analysis to address this issue. Investment in general 
training from the firm’s perspective is more risky than firm-specific training, because the former 
can be used in other firms in addition to the training firm (Becker, 1962). Assuming that firms 
investing in general worker training need to recover the costs by paying a wage below (the 
increased) productivity, workers have incentives to change the employer to obtain a wage 
corresponding to their productivity. Following our initial argument that worker training is risky 
for the firm, it should even be more risky when firms finance general training. For our study, 
this leads to the question of whether the relation between decision makers’ risk attitudes and 
time preferences persists, when we only focus on general training investments.
14
 Although we 
cannot precisely distinguish between general and firm-specific training in our data, we run 
separate regressions for firms that exclusively invest in external training. Our argument is that 
external training courses are more likely to contain general knowledge and skills than internal 
courses, because it is usually certified and standardized. Table A8 provides the results for firms 
financing only external training. The respective coefficient for the willingness to take risks is 
slightly smaller (and significant at the 5-percent level), while the coefficient for procrastination 
is slightly larger. Overall, the results of the alternative specification confirm those obtained from 
our main regression, as shown in Table 1.
15
 
Fifth, we test for heterogeneity in the relation between preferences and training investments 
across the training investment dimension. We run quantile regressions and plot the outcome in 
four different figures (intercept and the three preference measures), as shown in Figure A2. 
Overall, we do not find evidence for effect heterogeneity based on this test.  
Finally, we test for interaction effects in our regression, including the interaction terms of 
each pair of preferences (three interaction variables) and one interaction of all three preferences 
in the model that is given in Table 1. The regression results indicate that none of the included 
interaction terms is significantly different from zero, which suggests that the three preferences 
                                                          
13 We tested a similar approach for the age dimension. However, mean and variance in the respective economic 
sectors were very similar, so that a “more” homogeneous sub-sample could not be created.  
14 We define general training as knowledge and skills that are transferable to other firms. This also includes 
occupation-specific knowledge and skills. 
15 The regression using firms with only internal or internal and external training yields a risk coefficient of about the 
same size as in the case of using firms with only external training. However, this coefficient is not significant. 
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do not reinforce each other in their relation with training investments.
16
 Overall, our robustness 
analysis above generally supports the results obtained from our main regressions. 
 
5.4.2 Limitations 
Although we can draw on unique survey information about decision makers’ preferences, 
we need to address the potential limitations of the data. One of these limitations is that the 
questions concerning both the firms’ training activity and the decision makers’ preferences are 
reported by the same person in the same interview. In our case, the decision maker first reports, 
among others, the training participation, the number of trained workers and the training 
investment in the firm, and later answers questions about his/her preferences. A common 
method bias could arise, if the decision maker’s answers on the preference questions are 
correlated with the answers given on the firm’s training activities earlier in the interview. For 
our results to hold, we need to assume that there is no systematic relationship between the two 
sets of answers. Although we cannot fully rule out the possible existence of a common method 
bias, we argue that the long multi-purpose questionnaire prior to the preference questions 
touches upon a multitude of firm-related topics and that, at the point of answering the preference 
questions at the end of the survey, a direct cognitive connection to the firm’s worker training 
topic seems unlikely. Further, at least in the case of risk attitudes, we cannot speculate about the 
direction of the potential bias on the basis of the literature in the field.  
Another potential issue could be the existence of endogeneity in the form of reversed 
causality or missing variables correlated with both preferences and training investments. In our 
case, reverse causality would be an issue if a firm’s investment in training influences the 
decision maker’s preferences rather than the other way around. Without being able to test for 
reverse causality ourselves, we find mixed evidence with respect to the stability of risk or time 
preferences in the literature.
17
 Furthermore, the issue of reverse causality is discussed in several 
studies, providing little evidence for its existence for outcomes such as occupational choice 
(Bonin et al., 2007), migration (Jaeger et al., 2010) or self-employment (Ekelund et al., 2005). 
A missing variable bias could emerge, e.g. if a firm has a governing board that appoints the 
manager and at the same time determines the budget for training. In this case, the existence of a 
governance board would need to enter the regression as a control variable to yield unbiased 
results. Although we have no direct information about the governance structure in the firm, a 
possible bias would occur only for those firms, where managers are dependent on a board. 
                                                          
16
 The results are not shown in the paper but are available upon request. 
17 While Acosta (2015), Meier and Sprenger (2015) or Andersen et al. (2008b) find a relative stability of risk or time 
preferences, Chuang and Schechter (2015) find stable preferences in panel survey data, but a large instability in 
experimental settings. Brachert and Hill (2014) find changing risk attitudes for respondents becoming self-employed.  
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However, Table A5 shows that our estimates are robust when selecting on the owners/partners 
in the firm, which usually are not restricted by governing boards.  
Given the potential limitations imposed by the data, we refrain from interpreting our results 
as purely causal. Notwithstanding, this paper provides empirical findings that, contingent on our 
assumptions, lead to implications that are discussed in the final section of the paper. 
 
6 Implications  
This paper analyzed the link between decision makers’ individual preferences and firms’ 
investment behavior. Building on a simple profit-maximization model, we developed a set of 
hypotheses and tested these using firm-level survey data. Focusing on human capital investment 
in worker training as an example for “risky” investments, we find that a higher willingness to 
take risks of the decision maker is associated with a higher training investment of the firm. 
Furthermore, results provide support for the expected negative relationship between a decision 
maker’s level of procrastination (as a hyperbolic time preference) and a firm’s investment in 
training. A higher preference for future profits is, on the contrary, not significantly related to 
training investments, but rather to the provision and number of workers trained. These empirical 
findings are robust to several alternative specifications.  
The results of this paper have implications with respect to research, policy and practice. 
First, decision makers’ preferences have rarely been discussed in those areas of the training 
literature that address the question of why certain firms invest in training that is transferable 
across firms (i.e. in “general” training) while others do not. Until now, especially institutional 
factors (e.g. minimum wages, collective bargaining, employment protection) and labor market 
conditions (e.g. monopsony, mobility, poaching or wage structures) have been identified as 
strong determinants for training investments. Person-level preferences of decision makers as an 
explanation for firms’ training engagement have so far received little attention. Further studies 
should therefore shed light on the question of whether the observed differences in firms’ human 
capital investments within and across countries are (at least partly) driven by differences in the 
preferences of their decision makers. The question arises if changes in the risk attitudes and time 
preferences of decision maker cohorts could contribute to the observed increase in the provision 
of worker training in firms (Dummert and Leber, 2016).  
Second, from a policy perspective, the established link between preferences and firm 
investment would offer some scope for measures aiming to increase firms’ commitment to 
invest in the human capital of their workers. In the face of risk aversion and a present bias of 
decision makers, there could be an issue of underinvestment in worker training from a macro-
level perspective. Although we cannot directly test for underinvestment due to the lack of 
information on the optimal training investments, the theoretical model in this paper implies that 
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risk aversion and present bias would lead to an underinvestment in training when assuming 
perfect information. Upon confirmation of the results presented in this paper by other studies, 
the introduction of measures such as training funds or payback clauses could be discussed anew.  
Third, from the single firm’s perspective, our model and the empirical analysis suggest that 
the realized training investment of a firm could be suboptimal depending on the specific 
preferences of the decision maker. Firms could think about organizational mechanisms of how 
to correct for potential preference-effects in training investment decisions. For example, 
literature has shown that managers’ risk-taking behavior varied across and within different 
forms of monitoring systems (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). This observation implies that 
effective monitoring mechanisms could be one approach to tackle potential biases in decision 
making. Furthermore, March and Shapira (1987) discuss the prospects for changing managerial 
perspectives on the firm’s risk-taking through direct training. Such training could aim at 
neutralizing the possible link between personal preferences and firm-level decisions. Finally, 
more emphasis could be put on the testing and evaluating of personal preferences in the 
recruitment of managers with the aim to ensure an alignment of the personal attitudes of 
decision makers and the firm’s general market or investment strategies.  
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Appendix 
 
Equations:  
 
Equations A1: Intermediate steps in deriving the optimal amount of training for a firm 
 
 
 
𝜋 = 𝑝𝑏 ∙
1
(1 + 𝑟)
∙  𝑓 ∙ 𝑡𝛼  − 𝑡 
 
𝜋′ = 𝛼 ∙  𝑝𝑏 ∙
1
(1 + 𝑟)
∙  𝑓 ∙ 𝑡𝛼−1  − 1 =  0 
 
𝛼 ∙  𝑝𝑏 ∙
1
(1 + 𝑟)
∙  𝑓 ∙ 𝑡𝛼−1  =  1 
 
 𝑡𝛼−1  =  
(1 + 𝑟)
𝑓 𝛼 ∙  𝑝𝑏
 
 
 𝑡 = (
1 + 𝑟
𝑓 𝛼 𝑝𝑏
)
1
(𝛼−1)⁄
 
 
𝑡 = (
1 + 𝑟
𝑓 𝛼 𝑝𝑏
)
−1 (1−𝛼)⁄
 
 
𝑡∗  = (
𝑓 𝛼 𝑝𝑏 
1 + 𝑟
)
1
(1−𝛼)⁄
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Figures: 
Figure A1: Distribution of firms’ training investment (in €) 
Source: BIBB CBS 2012 
 
Figure A2: Quantile regressions of training investment on decision makers’ preferences 
 
Source: BIBB CBS 2012. 
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Tables:  
 Table A1: Descriptive information about training-related variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
            
Training in firm (yes/no) 2589 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Number of trained workers 2589 2.54 10.56 0 1300 
Training investment per trained worker in € 1768 1195 1334 0 21486 
       ...of those: Absence costs (AC) in € 1768 482 719 0 17986 
       ...of those: External training costs (EC) in € 1768 576 772 0 9500 
       ...of those: Internal training costs (IC) in € 1768 137 356 0 5500 
Training duration (h) in hours 1768 36 53 0 1200 
Source: BIBB CBS 2012. 
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Table A2: Descriptive information about individual-level and firm-level variables 
 
Variable Mean 
Individual level 
Willingness to take risks 5.09 
Procrastination 2.83 
Preference for future profits 7.09 
Interviewed: Owner/partner of firm 0.70 
Interviewed: CEO 0.13 
Interviewed: Head of department 0.04 
Interviewed: Head of HRM 0.04 
Interviewed: Head of HR development 0.00 
Interviewed: Business admin. manager 0.01 
Interviewed: Technical manager 0.01 
Interviewed: Training manager 0.01 
Interviewed: Other function in firm 0.04 
Only decision maker for training decisions 0.70 
Firm level - qualification structure, wage 
Firm older than 20 years 0.42 
Monthly wage management level (in €) 3367 
Works council in firms 0.04 
Covered by collective bargaining 0.34 
Firm trains apprentices 0.25 
Utilized capacity of firm: Fully used 0.33 
Share of workers without qualification 0.06 
Share of skilled workers 0.64 
Share of master craftsmen 0.16 
Share of workers with academic qualification 0.14 
Firm level - structural variables 
Firm size: 1-9 employees 0.78 
Firm size: 10-49 employees 0.18 
Firm size: 50-499 employees 0.04 
Firm size: 500 employees and more 0.00 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.03 
Mining and quarrying 0.00 
Manufacturing 0.10 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 0.00 
Water supply; sewerage; waste management and remediation activities 0.00 
Construction 0.13 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 0.22 
Transporting and storage 0.03 
Accommodation and food service activities 0.07 
Information and communication 0.02 
Financial and insurance activities 0.02 
Real estate activities 0.01 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 0.09 
Administrative and support service activities 0.06 
Public administration and defense; compulsory social security 0.01 
Education 0.02 
Human health and social work activities 0.11 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 0.01 
Other services activities 0.06 
Observations 2589 
Note: Not shown due to space limitations is the descriptive information about the regions (16 Länder) and 
the occupations of skilled workers in the firms (34). These are available upon request. Data source is the 
BIBB CBS 2012. 
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Table A3: Training participation and decision makers’ preferences 
 
Dependent variable: The firm trained workers in 2012 (yes/no) 
 (i): baseline (ii): (i) + 𝑋𝐷𝑚 (iii): (ii) + 𝑋𝑖 
Willingness to take risks -0.004 -0.003 0.023 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) 
Procrastination -0.030 -0.022 -0.013 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.022) 
Preference for future profits 0.036 0.042  0.060
**
 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) 
Reference: Owner/partner of firm 
 
Interviewed person: CEO 
  
 
0.576
***
 
 
 
0.575
***
 
  (0.159) (0.178) 
Interviewed person: Head of department  0.679
***
 0.820
***
 
  (0.212) (0.238) 
Interviewed person: Head of HRM  -0.075 -0.123 
  (0.311) (0.295) 
Interviewed person: Head of HR development  0.394 0.284 
  (0.390) (0.549) 
Interviewed person: Business admin. manager  0.482 0.693
**
 
  (0.312) (0.339) 
Interviewed person: Technical manager  0.428 0.289 
  (0.495) (0.493) 
Interviewed person: Training manager  0.405 0.285 
  (0.273) (0.306) 
Interviewed person: Other function in firm  -0.122 -0.105 
  (0.230) (0.246) 
Only decision maker  -0.176 -0.064 
  (0.147) (0.136) 
Firm older than 20 years   0.106 
   (0.121) 
Wage management level (in €)   0.000** 
   (0.000) 
Works council in firms   0.125 
   (0.191) 
Covered by collective bargaining   0.125 
   (0.144) 
Firm trains apprentices   -0.132 
   (0.112) 
Utilized capacity of firm: Fully used   0.105 
   (0.133) 
Qualification controls No No Yes 
Firm size controls No No Yes 
Economic sector controls No No Yes 
Occupation controls No No Yes 
Regional controls No No Yes 
Constant 0.211 0.165 -0.867 
 (0.232) (0.276) (0.647) 
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.036 0.269 
Observations 2589 2589 2589 
Notes: Probit regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. Data source is the BIBB CBS 2012. 
34 
Table A4: The number of trained workers and decision makers’ preferences 
 
Dependent variable: Number of trained workers in firm 
 (i): baseline (ii): (i) + Xind (iii): (ii) + Xfirm 
Willingness to take risks -0.020 -0.024 0.008 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.016) 
Procrastination -0.018 -0.019 -0.007 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.015) 
Preference for future profits 0.031 0.026 0.031
*
 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.016) 
Reference: Owner/partner of firm 
 
   
Interviewed person: CEO  0.109 0.196
**
 
  (0.135) (0.090) 
Interviewed person: Head of department  0.285 0.460
***
 
  (0.189) (0.122) 
Interviewed person: Head of HRM  -0.810
***
 -0.402
*
 
  (0.284) (0.226) 
Interviewed person: Head of HR development  0.212 0.768
*
 
  (0.383) (0.454) 
Interviewed person: Business admin. manager  0.024 0.521
**
 
  (0.272) (0.221) 
Interviewed person: Technical manager  -0.132 0.085 
  (0.309) (0.324) 
Interviewed person: Training manager  -0.159 0.177 
  (0.325) (0.200) 
Interviewed person: Other function in firm  -0.012 0.161 
  (0.214) (0.180) 
Only decision maker  0.104 0.116 
  (0.115) (0.082) 
Firm older than 20 years   0.042 
   (0.076) 
Wage management level (in €)   0.000 
   (0.000) 
Works council in firms   -0.016 
   (0.120) 
Covered by collective bargaining   0.033 
   (0.088) 
Firm trains apprentices   -0.119
*
 
   (0.071) 
Utilized capacity of firm: Fully used   0.105 
   (0.085) 
Qualification controls No No Yes 
Firm size controls No No Yes 
Economic sector controls No No Yes 
Occupation controls No No Yes 
Regional controls No No Yes 
Constant -1.393
***
 -1.418
***
 -2.652
***
 
 (0.207) (0.228) (0.454) 
Ln(alpha) 0.055 0.013 -0.676
***
 
 (0.094) (0.097) (0.143) 
R2 0.001 0.006 0.100 
Observations 2589 2589 2589 
Notes: Negative binomial regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Data source is the BIBB CBS 2012. 
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Table A5: Robustness – Sample restricted to specific groups of decision makers 
 
Dependent Variable: (Ln of) Training investments per trained worker 
 
Sample restricted to: 
Only owners/ 
partners 
Only owners/ 
partners and main 
management 
Only owners/partners and 
main management with 
full decision making 
power 
Willingness to take risks 0.037
*
   0.048
***
 0.042
*
 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.023) 
Procrastination   -0.052
***
  -0.046
**
 -0.045
*
 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.026) 
Preference for future profits -0.012 -0.036 -0.005 
 (0.027) (0.022) (0.029) 
Firm older than 20 years -0.066 -0.075 -0.047 
 (0.110) (0.101) (0.134) 
Wage management level (in €) -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Works council in firms -0.070 0.182 0.276 
 (0.346) (0.192) (0.325) 
Covered by collective bargaining 0.040 -0.055 -0.066 
 (0.124) (0.106) (0.144) 
Firm trains apprentices 0.124 -0.038 -0.057 
 (0.099) (0.080) (0.109) 
Utilized capacity of firm: Fully 
used 
0.159 -0.048 -0.024 
 (0.119) (0.109) (0.156) 
Number of workers trained (ln) -0.052 -0.025 -0.059 
 (0.098) (0.076) (0.094) 
Qualification controls Yes Yes Yes 
Firm size controls Yes Yes Yes 
Economic sector controls Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation controls Yes Yes Yes 
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes 
Constant   6.695
***
  6.354
***
   6.289
***
 
 (0.560) (0.430) (0.546) 
R2 0.494 0.337 0.356 
Observations 745 1381 789 
Notes: OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01. In Column 1, the sample is restricted to owners/partners. In Column 2, the sample is restricted 
to decision makers being 1) Owners/partners, 2) CEOs, 3) Heads of department or 4) Head of HRM. In 
Column 3 the sample is additionally restricted to decision makers having full autonomy in their training 
decision. Data source is the BIBB CBS 2012. 
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Table A6: Robustness – Subcomponents of training investment   
 
Dependent Variable in €: Absence costs 
(AC=h*w) 
Internal costs 
(IC) 
External costs 
(EC) 
Training 
hours (h) 
Willingness to take risks 27.461
**
 43.411
***
 31.251
**
 1.513
*
 
 (13.098) (16.535) (14.744) (0.899) 
Procrastination -33.670
***
 -9.462 -28.092
*
 -2.343
***
 
 (12.591) (14.166) (14.764) (0.854) 
Preference for future profits -12.944 -0.456 -4.046 -1.422 
 (15.417) (17.435) (16.571) (1.206) 
Firm older than 20 years 0.032
**
 -0.000 0.042
***
 0.001 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.016) (0.001) 
Wage management level (in €) 211.514* 94.039 -84.863 6.269 
 (123.998) (127.494) (139.154) (5.478) 
Works council in firms -110.572
*
 78.330 -30.053 -7.795 
 (64.829) (91.626) (63.104) (4.863) 
Covered by collective bargaining -63.320 -202.530
***
 88.675 -4.966 
 (60.545) (69.972) (58.686) (4.488) 
Firm trains apprentices 28.562 -164.279
*
 31.549 7.263 
 (90.114) (95.673) (75.362) (7.598) 
Utilized capacity of firm: Fully 
used 
-124.879
*
 97.138
*
 -65.013 -10.261
*
 
 (68.532) (50.447) (49.399) (5.368) 
Only decision maker Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Function interviewed person Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Qualification controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-size controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Economic sector controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 117.082 -1178.536
***
 -424.854 30.352 
 (305.508) (411.692) (369.613) (21.249) 
Pseudo R2 0.017 0.040 0.022 0.022 
Observations 1768 1768 1768 1768 
Left-censored (0) observations 25 1117 125 25 
Notes: Tobit regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. Data source is the BIBB CBS 2012. 
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Table A7: Robustness – Sample restricted to sectors with large quota of male managers 
 
Dependent Variable: Probit 
regression: 
Training 
participation 
Neg. binomial 
regression: 
Number of trained 
workers 
OLS regression: 
(Ln) training 
investment 
Willingness to take risks 0.017 0.009 0.064*** 
 (0.030) (0.020) (0.021) 
Procrastination -0.028 -0.011 -0.009 
 (0.026) (0.019) (0.021) 
Preference for future profits 0.087*** 0.049** -0.024 
 (0.033) (0.022) (0.024) 
Firm older than 20 years 0.283* 0.153 -0.091 
 (0.154) (0.096) (0.105) 
Wage management level (in €) 0.000*** 0.000 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Works council in firms 0.328 -0.050 -0.055 
 (0.255) (0.189) (0.185) 
Covered by collective bargaining -0.128 -0.101 0.210** 
 (0.179) (0.114) (0.103) 
Firm trains apprentices -0.151 -0.118 -0.166* 
 (0.145) (0.091) (0.097) 
Utilized capacity of firm: Fully 
used 
0.181 0.082 0.001 
 (0.156) (0.104) (0.117) 
Number of workers trained (ln)   -0.022 
   (0.076) 
Only decision maker Yes Yes Yes 
Function interviewed person Yes Yes Yes 
Qualification structure controls Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-size controls Yes Yes Yes 
Economic sector controls Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation controls Yes Yes Yes 
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.335** -2.758*** 6.118*** 
 (0.964) (0.640) (0.686) 
Ln(alpha)  -0.652***  
  (0.173)  
R2 0.254 0.084 0.400 
Observations 1541 1541 1059 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
The sample is restricted to sectors in which the quota of male managers (ISCO group 1) is greater than 
70%. The quota of male managers per sector is calculated using Mikrozensus data from 2012). Data 
source is the BIBB CBS 2012. 
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Table A8: Robustness – Sample restricted to firms with external training only   
 
Dependent Variable: (Ln of) Training investments per trained worker  
 (i): baseline (ii): (i) + 𝑋𝑑𝑚 (iii): (ii) + 𝑋𝑖 
Willingness to take risks 0.040
*
 0.040
*
 0.038
**
 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.017) 
Procrastination -0.012 -0.006 -0.041
**
 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) 
Preference for future profits -0.045
*
 -0.051
**
 -0.024 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.019) 
Firm older than 20 years   0.018 
   (0.087) 
Wage management level (in €)    -0.000 
   (0.000) 
Works council in firms   0.167 
   (0.170) 
Covered by collective bargaining   0.012 
   (0.087) 
Firm trains apprentices   0.053 
   (0.080) 
Utilized capacity of firm: Fully used   0.131 
   (0.094) 
Number of workers trained (ln)   -0.028 
   (0.064) 
Only decision maker No Yes Yes 
Function interviewed person No Yes Yes 
Qualification structure controls No No Yes 
Firm-size controls No No Yes 
Economic sector controls No No Yes 
Occupation controls No No Yes 
Regional controls No No Yes 
Constant 6.736
***
 6.544
***
 6.003
***
 
 (0.202) (0.217) (0.345) 
R2 0.021 0.083 0.475 
Observations 1018 1018 1018 
Notes: OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. The sample is restricted to firms that provide external training only. Firms that either 
provide internal and external training or only internal training are excluded. Data source is the BIBB CBS 
2012. 
